Authors:

Jose R. Cabañas Rodriguez

Denysse Fundora Agrelo

Dariel Quintana Fraga

 

Introduction

In mid-December 2024, the XXII edition of the series of dialogues on Cuba in the foreign policy of the United States took place in Havana. One of its panels was dedicated to cooperation in matters of application and compliance of the law between both countries. As part of it, several specialists from the Ministry of the Interior and other Cuban institutions shared information with those present and with those who followed the event online, which was considered very relevant and innovative.

At a time when a new government team is assuming power in the United States, it is useful to summarize the background and essential issues regarding this bilateral exchange, as a way of helping to prevent, once again, this cooperation from being harmed by the satisfaction of specific internal interests of U.S. policy, which ultimately end up benefiting the perpetrators of high-risk crimes against the security of both countries.

On January 19, 2023, the governments of Cuba and the United States published press releases informing the public about the holding of a meeting for the purpose of exchanging views on law enforcement cooperation. This formally restarted the Law Enforcement Dialogue between the two countries, which had been limited for approximately four years.

The parties involved agreed on the importance of cooperation on a sensitive issue for both countries, as highlighted in the press releases published at the time: “both delegations agreed that there are common phenomena associated with illegality that require cooperation” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2023)and that “these dialogues strengthen the capacity of the United States to combat criminal actors by increasing cooperation on various law enforcement issues, including human trafficking, narcotics, and other criminal cases. Increased coordination on law enforcement matters favors the interests of the United States and the Cuban people  (Departamento de Estado, 2023). ”

These exchanges have the potential to bring benefits to both governments, given the shared threats to national security that require bilateral confrontation. These include terrorism, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, cybersecurity and environmental disasters. Added to this is an unavoidable condition: the geographic proximity between Cuba and the United States, a reality that makes it urgent to face these challenges together. Cooperation in this area also benefits the security and protection of the citizens of both countries.

The initiation of the Law Enforcement Dialogue, as a bilateral exchange mechanism, took place in 2015, leading to the establishment of several agreements aimed at improving communication and coordination between law enforcement agencies on both sides (Cabañas Rodríguez 2021). A key antecedent of this cooperation was the establishment of a Coast Guard Liaison in the United States Interests Section in Havana in June 1999. Through this official, the exchange of information on matters related to communications between law enforcement authorities, bilateral efforts to combat drug trafficking, illegal migration, and fleets of vessels from South Florida seeking to travel to Cuba, among other crimes, was streamlined. With the appointment of this liaison, direct contacts between the Coast Guard and the Ministry of the Interior were increased and made more efficient. (Cromwell, 2021)

This article aims to explore the evolution of cooperation between Cuba and the United States in the area of law enforcement, with an emphasis on the most relevant agreements and initiatives, their main results and limitations, based on the assumption that a pragmatic approach to this issue is in the national security interests of both countries.

Development

Bilateral law enforcement and compliance cooperation relations have developed in the context of the historical conflict between Cuba and the United States. These relations were particularly limited after the triumph of the Revolution in January 1959.

Despite the persistent hostility, the governments of both countries managed to carry out specific cooperation actions, on a case-by-case basis, and to reach limited cooperation agreements during the following years. The Agreement on the Hijacking of Air and Sea Vessels and Other Crimes of 1973 stands out. In addition, a meeting between Border Guard Troops and the Coast Guard Service took place in 1978 where coordination in the area of Maritime Rescue and Salvage, the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking were discussed  (Franklin, 2015).

The case-by-case cooperation highlighted the exchange of information on an attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan in the summer of 1984  (Castro Ruz, 2007); the discovery of more than 6 tons of cocaine on board the ship Limerick in October 1996, after the U.S. authorities informed Cuba of their suspicions regarding the vessel (Castro Ruz, 1999); and the visit to Cuba in 1998 by representatives of the FBI to hold meetings with Cuban experts on terrorist plans against Cuba in the context of the attacks on Cuban hotels in those years. In this last meeting, the Cuban authorities provided testimonial and documentary evidence proving the direct participation of individuals residing in the United States in the organization and preparation of these acts.

This cooperation on specific issues, as seen in the examples above, grew during the 1990s and included areas such as drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and combating terrorism, among others. One particular area in which relations expanded during these years was the exchange between the United States Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard, on the occasion of the migration agreements of 1994 and 1995. Relations between these services gradually expanded to areas of combating migrant smuggling, drug trafficking, as well as search and rescue actions, among others.

Following the growth of cooperation during the 1990s, the Cuban government proposed to the United States in November 2001 to formalize bilateral agreements on migration issues, combating terrorism and drug trafficking, (Leogrande & Kornbluh, 2016)which were not responded to by the latter.

Following the arrival of Barack Obama to the presidency of the United States and taking as a precedent the increase in this cooperation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Cuban government identified the possibility of expanding it and proposed the formalization of agreements on this matter in 2009. Once again, the US government refused to establish these agreements. However, cooperation was increased on a case-by-case basis and expanded starting in 2013 and 2014, when technical meetings were held between Cuban and US experts on migration, on the fight against drug trafficking, and between Border Guard Troops and the Coast Guard Service.

It is worth noting that this specific cooperation took place in a context of confrontation and hostility in the United States' policy towards Cuba.

It is well documented that during all these years the Cuban people were victims of terrorist actions, sabotage and biological warfare, both within and outside its national borders. Some of these actions were carried out in the United States itself. Not only have the perpetrators of these acts lived in that territory and received protection, but it has also been used as a base of operations to organize and finance most of these activities, which have caused more than 5,000 victims, with significant loss of life and material damage.

Formalization of bilateral cooperation on Law Enforcement and Compliance during the administration of President Barack Obama (2009-2017).

The context of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and the process towards the normalization of bilateral relations that began with the announcements of December 17, 2014, offered a new opportunity to expand cooperation on these issues. After the first 6 months of 2015 in which negotiations focused on the reestablishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of embassies in both countries, law enforcement authorities began negotiations on several of these issues (Cabañas Rodríguez, 2021).

In this way, the mechanism for Dialogue on Law Enforcement and Compliance between Cuba and the United States was established in November 2015. This mechanism has functioned as a space for exchange between the leadership of the agencies linked to such issues between both countries. Since November 9, 2015, 6 meetings of this dialogue have been held, until February 24, 2024, in which representatives of multiple agencies from both countries have participated, including the Departments of State, Justice and Internal Security on the part of the United States and the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Justice of Cuba, as well as the General Customs of the Republic and the Attorney General's Office on the part of Cuba.

Under this mechanism, specific legal instruments were negotiated between 2015 and 2016. The most comprehensive of these is the “Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Cuba and the United States of America for Cooperation in Law Enforcement and Compliance Matters” signed on January 16, 2017. This Memorandum recognizes the need to establish cooperation between the law enforcement and enforcement agencies of both countries in the prevention, interdiction, monitoring, investigation and prosecution of transnational crimes with an impact on national security (Pérez Rodríguez, 2024). It established the creation of eight technical working groups in priority areas for both countries. These are:

• Confronting terrorism
• Fighting illicit drug trafficking
• Tackling migrant smuggling and immigration fraud
• Tackling money laundering and other financial crimes,
• Cybersecurity and Combating Cybercrime
• Confronting human trafficking,
• Trade security and protection of people
• Legal assistance in criminal matters

This memorandum also established the exchange of information, the exchange of experiences, best practices and methodologies, as well as coordinated operations as modalities for cooperation. For the exchange of information, contact points were established between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Attorney General's Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Directorate of International Relations of the Ministry of the Interior, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) with the Technical Investigations Directorate, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service (ICE), the Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP) with the Directorate of Identification, Immigration and Foreigners, and the Coast Guard Service with Border Guard Troops. 

This agreement could be considered one of the most important signed between the two governments. Unlike others signed under the Barack Obama administration, this one involved a larger number of U.S. federal agencies and official institutions in Cuba. In addition, it is one of those most directly related to the national security of the respective countries, whatever definition is assumed for this concept.(Pérez Rodríguez, 2024)

The other instruments on the application and enforcement of the law signed during that period were:

1. Ship-to-Ship Communication Protocol between Border Guard Troops and the Coast Guard Service (21.04.2015).
2. Memorandum of Understanding between the MININT, the General Customs Office of the Republic and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (5.5.2016)
3. Arrangement for operational cooperation between Cuba and the United States to combat illicit trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances. (21.7.2016)
4. Agreement between the governments of Cuba and the United States on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (01/18/2017)

Contradictions in bilateral cooperation during the Donald Trump administration (2017-2021).

During the Donald Trump administration (2017-2021), bilateral cooperation between the United States and Cuba was affected due to the "maximum pressure" policy implemented by his Administration.

Coinciding with Trump's election in November 2016, alleged arguments to damage bilateral relations began to appear in American sources, the best known of which was related to the so-called "sonic attacks" of which American officials based in Havana were allegedly victims (Cabañas Rodríguez, 2023). Despite the falsity of these claims having been documented, as a result of these and other actions, bilateral relations deteriorated with the consequent impact on cooperation in matters of law enforcement and compliance.

Despite the growing tensions between the two countries, some cooperation mechanisms remained active during 2017 and 2018. On June 16, 2017, the US president signed Presidential Memorandum NSPM-5, which, although it did not cancel existing bilateral agreements, created a hostile environment by not recognizing the Cuban government as a “legitimate interlocutor.” This complicated the development of relations and created internal contradictions within the US government, as some officials defended the continuation of security cooperation (González Morales, 2019).

Reflecting these disagreements, the third and fourth meetings of the bilateral Dialogue on Law Enforcement and Compliance were held in September 2017 and July 2018. During that same period, technical meetings were held on the subject of combating terrorism, drug trafficking, cybersecurity, human trafficking, and money laundering. All of this reflected the interest of sectors within the U.S. government to maintain spaces for dialogue with Cuba, which had a direct impact on that country's national security.

However, as his term progressed, due to changes in his National Security team and the priority given to the confrontation with Venezuela (in which Cuba was made a part), there was a notable decrease in interagency meetings. The Cuban proposal to hold the fifth meeting of the Law Enforcement and Compliance Dialogue in 2019 received no response. From that moment on, there was evidence of a setback in the working groups established to facilitate cooperation, as a result of tensions between the domestic political interests that dominated policy towards Cuba and the operational interests of the agencies linked to this cooperation.

 

The US government's political decision to limit operational cooperation between the two countries has had an impact on the increase in criminal activity and irregular migration flows, which had remained at their lowest levels in recent years between 2016 and 2018, thanks to the bilateral agreement signed in January 2017.

 

Despite the aggressive rhetoric against Cuba, the Cuban government reiterated its willingness to continue respectful dialogue and cooperation on issues of mutual interest, as well as the negotiation of pending bilateral issues with the United States.

As will be recalled, during the handover of his officials to a new government, Trump's Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, again included Cuba in the list of countries that allegedly sponsor Terrorism, reversing the decision taken by the specialized US agencies in April 2015 (Fernández de Cossio, 2021).

Hesitation and progress during the Josep Biden government 2021-2024.

Despite the direct ties that many of the members of the new team had with the process towards the normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States, which took place between 2015 and 2016, the Biden Administration faithfully implemented a significant part of the unilateral coercive measures imposed by its predecessor, as a sign of its commitment to a policy of “regime change” in Cuba.

This commitment was greater than the efforts of sectors that supported rapprochement with Cuba and the internal political context that was favorable to a return to policies of improving bilateral relations (Quintana Fraga, 2024). Among the main causes of this persistence was the perception of the new US National Security team about the alleged “fragility” of the Cuban government, based on the impact of the COVID19 pandemic and the resulting effect on the economy, due to the large expenses generated by the priority of protecting and saving the entire population.

The failure of this maximum pressure strategy was evident at the end of 2021 and led to other considerations once again gaining weight in the formulation of Cuba policy. In February 2022, the US government proposed the resumption of migration talks with Cuba, which had been suspended in 2018. This action demonstrated that this issue was regaining influence in the US government's assessments. In March, the US Embassy in Havana announced the resumption of consular services on a limited basis, which responded to a demand from the Cuban community living in that country and to the interest in recovering spaces of influence of its Embassy in Havana  (Quintana Fraga, 2024).

The changes introduced to the Cuba policy during 2022 were gradually complemented by an increase in official bilateral cooperation on issues of mutual interest. Essentially, in the areas of migration, law enforcement, environmental protection, health, scientific exchange, air transportation safety, and agriculture. The expansion of this cooperation responded to the influence of various US agencies that recognize the existence of mutual interests between both countries and that managed to benefit from them during the negotiation process that took place between 2015 and 2017.

The Department of Homeland Security and several of its subordinate agencies, such as the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Homeland Security Investigations, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Department of Justice; the Department of Transportation; and the Department of Defense have been among those primarily interested in preserving and expanding bilateral cooperation with Cuba.

As part of the expansion of cooperation in this area, the Fifth and Sixth Meetings of the Law Enforcement Dialogue were held in January 2023 in Havana and February 2024 in Washington, respectively. Various technical meetings were also held and the work of several of the 8 technical working groups mentioned above was reactivated.

It was not until the end of his term that Biden made a decision that could have been fundamental (Fernández de Cossio, 2024) in the development of these links, by removing Cuba from the list of countries that supposedly sponsor terrorism , an action that was immediately left without effect by Donald Trump and his second-season team.

Results of official bilateral cooperation on Law Enforcement and Compliance 2015 – 2024.

Since the establishment of the Law Enforcement Dialogue Mechanism in November 2015, the technical working groups have developed their work at different paces, based on the priorities assigned to them by each country, the evolution of the threats they face and the dynamics of the agencies involved in their operation.

1. 1. 1. 1. Confronting Terrorism.

Four technical meetings and more than 15 meetings with the FBI have been held. Information has been exchanged on terrorist plans and actions that threaten the security of both countries. In 2017, an operational Point of Contact was established between the FBI and the MININT, through which investigative actions on cases of mutual interest were coordinated.

During 2018, the second year of Donald Trump's first administration, a mechanism was implemented to receive alerts from the United States Terrorism Monitoring Center on the transit through Cuba of individuals suspected of being linked to terrorism. This was an initiative by the United States that put national security interests above domestic political interests (Pérez Rodríguez, 2024).

These alerts made it possible to coordinate the arrest, by Cuban authorities, and his delivery to the FBI in August 2018, of the American citizen Joseph Dibee accused of domestic terrorism in the United States (Juventud Rebelde, 2018). Despite these results, at the end of 2018 the American counterparts suspended the sending of these notifications to Cuba and since June 2022 the communication of the point of contact with the FBI has been cut off, without even acknowledging receipt of the messages sent by the Cuban authorities.

In 2023, the 4th technical meeting was held in Havana, and the U.S. side postponed the 5th Technical Meeting in 2024. Since 2018, the U.S. side has been pending the reconciliation of a Project of Operational Procedures to improve the exchange of information between the FBI and the MININT.

1. 1. 1. 2. Confronting illicit drug trafficking.

In 2016, the “Arrangement for Operational Cooperation between Cuba and the United States to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances” was signed and a Contact Point was established for the exchange of information between the Specialized Anti-Drug Confrontation Body of the Technical Investigation Directorate of the MININT and the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which has allowed the exchange of information between authorities of both countries to be maintained. Three face-to-face technical meetings have been held, the last in January 2018 in the United States. In July 2023, a virtual technical meeting was held on this matter. The Cuban Party has sent information and requests for cooperation based on the detection of attempts to introduce drugs into Cuba and has regularly shared annual reports on the “Behavior of drug activities in the Republic of Cuba. Main results in their confrontation”

In 2019, the Cuban side requested assistance in the return of Cuban citizen Randy Asnaldo Pérez Ruano, who was in U.S. territory and was being circulated by Cuban authorities for crimes of homicide and international drug trafficking. This cooperation led to the successful apprehension of the fugitive, who was also wanted in the United States. (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs., 2019)

Since 2018, the proposal for “Operational Procedures for the exchange of information between the DNA and the DEA” was presented and approved, but its signature is awaiting definition at the next technical meeting. The US Party has not responded to most of the information and Cuban proposals for cooperation to investigate and act together in the fight against this crime.

Today, Cuban emigrants linked to drug trafficking into the country continue to act with impunity due to the passivity and lack of action of the North American authorities. They use other passengers, parcel agencies, non-commercial cargo and the postal route to introduce drugs into Cuba. The drugs that have the greatest impact on trafficking from the United States to Cuba are synthetic cannabinoids and, to a lesser extent, cocaine and methamphetamines.

In 2023, joint operations of Border Guard Troops and the Coast Guard Service seized 340.7 kg of marijuana (Ministerio del Interior, 2023). In addition, 248 drug stoppages were recorded in Cuba in which 1,787.019 kg of drugs were seized.

3. Cybersecurity and combating cybercrime

Between 2016 and 2018, five technical meetings were held in which information was exchanged on cyber incidents involving both countries. A point of contact was established between the Cuban Cyberspace Security Center and the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Cuban side has provided expert information on numerous cyber incidents involving U.S. IP addresses.

In the first half of 2017 alone, the Cuban side provided information to the US side about 19 attempted cyber attacks against the United States, attempting to use IP addresses in Cuba.

Since June 2018, Cuba has proposed to continue the mechanism and hold the 5th Technical Meeting, but has not received a response. In fact, the US side has not responded to Cuban proposals for cooperation to investigate and jointly confront these criminal modalities.

4. Migrant smuggling and immigration fraud

Given the incidence of these crimes and the importance of cooperation on migration between the two countries, this has been the most active working group since the formalization of bilateral cooperation.

Eight technical meetings have been held, the last of which took place on April 17, 2024. Cuba has provided information and proposals for cooperation to jointly investigate and confront migrant traffickers based in the United States and third countries.

During 2024, Cuban authorities transferred information on 156 cases of migrant smuggling and irregular migration attempts to the point of contact with the Department of Homeland Security. These cases referred to 426 people of 50 nationalities who attempted to use Cuba as a transit point to migrate to the United States, both by sea and to insert themselves into the irregular land flow towards the southern border of that country. These messages corresponded to the incidence of human trafficking networks on the transit of foreigners in Cuban airports, which provide false documents to both Cuban and foreign citizens.

Between January 2023 and October 2024, a total of 445 Cuban citizens were found to have false documents, mostly visas and residencies in Mexico and " humanitarian paroles ", as well as 296 foreigners who used them to try to violate border controls, mainly Visas (169), Residencies (47) and Passports (20), to enter the United States irregularly. By country of falsified documents in the cases of foreigners, Mexico, Great Britain, Nicaragua, Mali and Schengen visas predominated.

More complex cases were also detected at Cuban airport borders, involving 99 foreigners from other continents who attempted to impersonate others by using authentic documents with details that differ from the bearer's real ones.

Cuban authorities are also monitoring attempts by foreigners to leave the country illegally by sea to the United States. Between 2023 and 2024, 46 such incidents were detected and interrupted, involving 146 people from 27 countries (India, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, Uganda, France, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jordan, Mongolia, Vietnam, Angola, China, Nepal, Russia, Mali, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Haiti, Indonesia, Albania, Ecuador, Bahamas, Nigeria, Brazil and Armenia).

In the face of these phenomena and with the aim of maintaining regular, orderly and safe migration, Cuban authorities carry out actions at the air border against foreigners who show signs of being involved in possible human trafficking, whose journey is interrupted and they are re-embarked to the country of origin on the same airline. Between 2023 and 2024, 982 such cases will be recorded.

Active cooperation in this area also faces obstacles. These include insufficient feedback from U.S. authorities in response to the increase in this flow of information and the requests made by Cuban authorities, the impunity of human traffickers operating from U.S. territory, particularly South Florida, about whom Cuba has provided sufficient information, and the absence of effective cooperation to address serious events that have threatened the national security of both countries.

5. Tackling money laundering and financial crimes

Two technical meetings were held, in which the interest in expanding cooperation to combat money laundering and credit card fraud was agreed upon. The Cuban authorities have shared and requested information on people who have committed financial crimes in the United States before resettling in Cuba and have requested assistance to achieve the return of Cuban citizens who have settled in that country evading criminal prosecution in Cuba, where they are accused of committing financial crimes.

 

In 2018, it was agreed to hold an exchange between representatives of financial units from both countries on trends in money laundering behavior in the region and to evaluate the exchange of information and cases of interest, which did not materialize due to a lack of responses from the US counterpart. In 2024, Cuba proposed holding a virtual technical meeting on this matter, but no response was received either.

 

The incidence of these crimes in Cuba involves Cuban emigrants or resettled people who intend to use illicit funds introduced from the United States as a result of their participation in the Medicare fraud or others, to invest in non-state forms of management or in the agricultural sector, as well as to acquire movable or immovable property. Other cases include the cloning of cards, the detection of large sums of cash at the border by nationals who travel from the United States and do not declare it, as well as Cuban citizens who are the subject of searches circulated by INTERPOL or at the state level, who arrive with the purpose of taking refuge in Cuba and evading justice. Regarding these last cases, the Cuban authorities have prosecuted 9 of them, despite not having received the elements requested from the United States authorities.

 

6. Trade security and protection of people.

Two technical meetings have been held, the last in November 2017, in which the need to consolidate cooperation in this area was agreed upon. The work of this group was specifically addressed at the Fourth Meeting of the Law Enforcement and Compliance Dialogue held in Havana in January 2023. Exchanges and visits to port and airport facilities in Cuba and the United States have been carried out, the last of which took place in February 2023, when Cuban representatives visited the port of Wilmington in North Carolina.

The Cuban side has reiterated the need to adopt new measures in response to security violations committed at its airports and the failure to comply with the provisions of the “Safe Flights Program” conceived by the United States. The Cuban authorities have provided information and requested cooperation on the detection of firearms and prohibited substances in passengers arriving from the United States. However, no new technical meetings have been held due to a lack of response from the United States authorities. Nor have there been any responses to the operational and diplomatic messages sent by Cuba on the incidents and violations mentioned above.

7. Legal assistance in criminal matters

Two technical meetings have been held, the last one in January 2018, in the United States. The work of this technical group was also included in the V and VI meetings of the Law Enforcement and Compliance Dialogue that took place in January 2023 in Havana and February 2024 in Washington DC, respectively.

 

This mechanism has enabled investigators, prosecutors, lawyers and authorities from both countries to carry out investigative and judicial actions in the territory of the other party, based on criminal proceedings. Information has been shared and cooperation in criminal matters has been coordinated through the point of contact between the Attorney General's Office (FGR) of Cuba and the Department of Justice.

 

The exchange of information between these points of contact has offered concrete benefits to both countries. After repeated requests from Cuban authorities, the Department of Justice shared, in April 2024, police information and evidence that allowed the restart of a criminal case against a Cuban citizen accused of committing a murder in 2005 in Arkansas and who had resettled in Cuba to evade prosecution. This case had previously been archived by Cuban authorities due to lack of relevant evidence.

 

Since 2016, when the Memorandum of Understanding on this matter was signed with the United States, Cuba has provided and requested information from that country on more than 40 events and persons linked to crimes of terrorism, drug trafficking, homicides, human trafficking, crimes of appropriation and other criminal conduct. The US authorities have only responded in 6 of these cases. For their part, the Cuban authorities have answered all the requests from the US side.

 

Since 2024, Cuban authorities have proposed the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation between the Directorate of International Legal Cooperation and International Relations of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Cuba and the Office of Foreign Affairs, Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice, without receiving a response.

 

As part of this mechanism, the Cuban government shared with the U.S. authorities the “ National List of persons and entities that have been subjected to criminal investigations and are wanted by the Cuban authorities, based on their involvement in the promotion, planning, organization, financing, support or commission of acts carried out in the national territory or in other countries.” Most of the 61 persons and 19 entities on that list are based in the United States. The authorities of that country have not provided any response regarding the actions taken against them.

 

8. Confronting human trafficking

A technical meeting was held in February 2018 in Washington DC. Discussions were held on the current situation in the fight against this phenomenon, the common threats and risks. Law enforcement agencies involved in the fight against this scourge were identified in order to promote operational cooperation. The continuity of the technical meetings was interrupted due to a lack of response from the US side.

As part of the maximum pressure measures implemented by the Donald Trump administration in 2019, Cuba was included in level 3 of the State Department’s annual report on Trafficking in Persons under the pretext that “the Cuban government benefited from the export of medical professionals  (Departamento de Estado, 2019).” This language had been promoted since 2017 to attack Cuban international cooperation and was finally included in this report with the intention of limiting the income received by the Cuban government from the South-South cooperation agreements established in this area.

Cooperation between Cuban Border Guard Troops and the United States Coast Guard.

Cooperation between the Cuban Border Guard Troops (TGF) and the United States Coast Guard (SGC) has been the most stable and long-lasting between the agencies of both countries. In 1984, a direct line of communication between both agencies was established via fax. From 1999 to 2024, 13 officers have been based in Havana to serve as liaisons between the Coast Guard Service and the Cuban authorities. There have also been 11 technical meetings between TGF-SGC, where topics such as combating international drug trafficking and illegal immigration by sea, coordination of maritime search and rescue operations, exchanges on port security, and coordination of responses to oil spills in the Straits of Florida have been addressed.

In November 2022, the Chief of the Seventh District of the Coast Guard, Rear Admiral Brendan McPherson, visited Havana, where he held exchanges with the Cuban authorities and recognized the importance of cooperation between both services.

A fluid exchange of information is maintained through the SGC Liaison at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. There is real-time, “case-by-case” communication between the TGF Operational Centers and the SGC 7th District. Over the past ten years, U.S. authorities have been alerted about more than 500 drug introduction operations into their territory, in which timely and accurate information has been transferred about the location of naval assets, characteristics, and possible routes. The U.S. Party is still pending the signing of the “Operational Procedures for the TGF-SGC Information Exchange.”

Conclusions

Bilateral cooperation between Cuba and the United States in law enforcement has faced significant challenges due to the historical conflict that defines bilateral relations, the politicization of this cooperation by the current United States government, by subordinating it to specific domestic political interests and not to the priorities of its main agencies based on their own national security interests.

In the past ten years, on at least two occasions this cooperation has been limited under the assumption that a “regime change” would occur in Cuba. That expectation was not met, and yet threats to both Cuba and the United States have grown due to the lack of cooperation in the application and enforcement of the law.

Between 2015 and 2024, the effectiveness of this collaboration and its contribution to the security of both countries, despite being limited, has been demonstrated. It has led to the confrontation and criminal prosecution of transnational crimes, the exchange of information, evidence, experiences and good practices, as well as the carrying out of joint investigations and the transfer of defendants.

For this reason, the Cuban government has maintained its willingness to expand bilateral cooperation regardless of the political affiliation of the U.S. governments and has emphasized its interest in working together in critical areas for both countries. A similar position has been taken by sectors linked to law enforcement agencies within the U.S. government itself.

The agreements reached have established a favourable framework for technical cooperation and information exchange between various government agencies, which has been maintained despite changes in bilateral relations. Between 2023 and 2024, bilateral cooperation in these areas was expanded.

However, fundamental challenges remain that limit the potential of this cooperation. These include the interruption of some technical meetings, the lack of response to Cuban proposals and requests for information, as well as the inaction of the US authorities regarding complaints from residents in that country who act with impunity against the Island.

As has been done before, trying to imagine what the end of unilateral coercive measures applied by the United States would mean for Cuba, it is worth asking what levels of cooperation could be achieved in matters related to the application and enforcement of the law, if this policy of extreme hostility were to end and what would be the benefit in terms of greater security for the populations of both countries.

Cuban institutions offer irrefutable evidence and arguments on these issues; they do not stop to speculate on the nature of their counterpart.

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